This paper investigates the manner in which private equity and venture capital firms in South Africa assess investment opportunities. The analysis was facilitated using a survey containing both Likert-scale and open-ended questions. The key findings show that both private equity and venture capital firms rate the entrepreneur or management team more highly above any other criterion or consideration. Private equity firms, however, also place emphasis on financial criteria more than venture capitalists. There is also an observable shift in the investment activities away from start-up funding and towards later-stage deals. Risk appetite has also declined post the financial crisis.
Introduction
Besides limited access to start-up capital as an inhibitor to entrepreneurship in South Africa, many other factors have come up in entrepreneurial surveys. In a survey by Herrington, Kew & Kew (2009) , 81% of respondents cited shortage of capital as the biggest challenge in their businesses. However other challenges cited relate to business planning (68%), insufficient information knowledge (75%), quality of employees (57%), and issues around the marketing of products/services (57%). In this regard private equity (PE) becomes an important source of financing for such businesses. This is because PE firms do not just provide funding but also bring a wealth of experience, knowledge, expertise, networks, alliances and new customers to the businesses they fund. They provide capital to high-risk businesses that other capital providers would not otherwise fund. These include businesses without track records, rapidly growing businesses in constant need of external funding and distressed or troubled companies.
Private equity broadly refers two forms of investments; venture capital (VC) and buyouts (Smolarski, 2007) . While PE is commonly used to refer to the buyouts of later-stage businesses, VC provides seed or start-up capital to early-stage and high-growth businesses, mostly innovation-based. capital is provided by friends and family with the so-called "angel investors" often filling the funding gap between friends and family and VC investors (Wainwright & Groeninger, 2005) 2 . Wright et al. (2009: 2) describe PE as "an increasingly important mechanism to rapidly and radically restructure organisations worldwide." In this context, it is becoming ever more important that the PE market functions as well as possible so as to best provide alternative funding and encourage economic growth (Zider, 1998) .
Review of related literature

The functionality of private equity and venture capital markets
In an attempt to determine how the success of the US venture capital market can be replicated in other countries, Gilson (2003 Gilson ( : 1069 expounds on three factors that are crucial, namely, "capital, specialised financial intermediaries, and entrepreneurs." Gilson (2003) explains that the availability of capital and the support of effective financial intermediaries will lead to the promotion and facilitation of entrepreneurial activity. This model, as described by Gilson (2003) , offers a clear and succinct perspective of VC market development.
Another useful model was first advanced by Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) . This model has five distinct steps, that is, deal origination, screening, evaluation, deal structuring, and post investment activities. Whereas the screening phase in the Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) model is only a firm-specific screen, Fried and Hisrich (1994) , in a subsequent article, suggested that there are in fact two screening phases, one firm-specific and the other generic. The screening phase in Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) only takes into account basic criteria such as deal size, geographical location and stage of financing. It does not take into account pre-evaluation factors such as the quality of the business plan or relevant proposal-specific knowledge held by the venture capitalists. These are accounted for in the Fried and Hisrich (1994) version.
A further difference in the Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) and Fried and Hisrich (1994) models is the inclusion of an additional evaluation phase by the later authors. This phase relates to the VC evaluation activity post the pricing settlement. In isolation, the VC process model has limited applicability. However, as a lens through which to understand VC activity, and by extension PE activity, it is useful for two reasons. Firstly, it provides a clear perspective of the investment process and allows one to contextualise how and when VC firms apply their investment decision criteria. Secondly, it is useful in understanding the VC cycle model created by Gompers and Lerner (2000) described as one of sustainable and self-renewing growth. It explains the development of a VC market as a product life cycle that begins with the raising of funds from investors, continues with the investment in companies, the monitoring of and value addition to these companies, and ends with the successful exit from the investment and the returning of capital to investors. The cycle then renews itself with the raising of new funds (Gompers & Lerner, 2000) .
A final consideration in the functionality of PE markets is the phenomenon of syndication, the process whereby two or more investment firms partake in an investment opportunity. Lockett & Wright (2001) suggested three rationales for syndication, that is, to share financial risk, to pool resources to specific target levels, and to boost deal flow through reciprocity with other PE firms. According to Hege et al. (2003) , a mature market, such as the US, benefits considerably more from syndication than a younger market, such as in Europe.
Consistent with the findings of Hege et al. (2003) , Bent, Williams & Gilbert (2004) found that while syndicated investments appear to outperform stand-alone investments, only a relatively small proportion of around 13% of previous PE investments had been syndicated in South Africa, compared to an equivalent figure of 60% in the US.
Private equity and venture capital in South Africa
Previous studies have questioned the effectiveness of adapting the US VC model to other countries such as Brazil (de Lima Ribeiro & de Carvalho, 2008) and South Africa (Lingelbach, Murray & Gilbert, 2008) . In their findings, Lingelbach et al. (2008) indicated that the traditional simultaneity and VC cycle models, proposed by Gilson (2003) and Gompers & Lerner (2000) , respectively, are insufficient in explaining VC development in emerging economies such as South Africa. Lingelbach et al. (2008) proposed an alternative model which introduces the concept of coproduction 3 as a third necessary process for the formulation of a successful VC market. This model was tested by Lingelbach & Gilbert (2009) in a study on Botswana.
In South Africa, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is also a necessary and important driver of PE activity. According to Missankov, Van Dyk, Va Biljon, Hayes & Van der Veen (2006: 56) , BEE dominates the South African PE industry and is promoted either through the ownership and management structure of PE managers or through the funding sources used for the PE transactions. It is estimated that more than 90% of total PE transactions in South Africa and 100% of buyout transactions have a BEE element (Missankov et al., 2006: 56) .
With such an obvious state-induced influence over the PE industry in South Africa, it is, therefore, not surprising that Lingelbach et al. (2008) lay part of the blame for VC stagnation in the country on BEE. It can thus be deduced that BEE acts as a catalyst in later-stage PE investments (Missankov et al., 2006) , on one hand, and as an inhibitor in early-stage VC investments (Lingelbach et al., 2008) on the other.
Another feature of the South African PE market is its skewness towards later-stage investment activity. Internationally, the PE industry has shown considerable growth over the last 10 years, and South Africa is no exception to this (van Niekerk & Krige, 2009) . A significant component of this growth is, however, accounted for by the later-stage buyout end of the market (Wright et al., 2009) . While markets such as the US and Asia (Pintado, De Lima & Van Auken, 2007) still maintain a strong focus on early-stage VC investments, other markets, such as Europe (Pintado et al., 2007) , Brazil (de Lima Ribeiro & de Carvalho, 2008) , Australia (Hudson & Evans, 2005) , and South Africa (Jones, 2009; Lingelbach et al., 2008; Roodt, 2007; Stillman, Sunderland, Heyl & Swart, 1999) are investing more in laterstage projects. Given this, it seems incongruent that the majority of published literature has tended to focus on addressing issues relating to early-stage VC activity. The investment decision criteria so far documented relate more to VC firms that invest in early-stage projects than to PE. (Bellew et al., 2011) . Foreign fund managers with deals on the continent can also set base in the country with ease if it is essential for them to do so (Bellew et al., 2011) . Therefore, given this regulatory background, the question that remains is what else do PE/VC firms in South Africa consider in making their investment decisions.
The South African Regulatory Environment for PE/VC Firms
Evaluation criteria in private equity and venture capital
Although Quindlen (2000: 169) describes the process of valuing an early-stage investment as "much more an art than a science", the most common methods used by VC firms include the discounted cash flow (DCF) method, the earnings multiple approach, the net asset value (NAV) approach, and the subjective VC method (Ge, Mahoney & Mahoney, 2005) . Manigart, Waele, Wright, Robbie, Debrieres, Sapienza & Beekman (2000) found that there are considerable differences in the valuation techniques used across the countries they studied. They attributed this primarily to differences in maturity levels of the markets. Smolarski (2007) asserts that differences "are not as large as previously and that the preinvestment stage is relatively homogenous across countries."
While the above concerns relate to the valuation of new ventures undertaken by VC firms, similar concerns can be inferred for later-stage PE investments. Diller & Kaserer (2009: 648) state that when compared to the relatively efficient public exchanges, the lack of a continuous market for PE investments result in information asymmetries in the market. Of more importance in PE than in publicly traded funds are the management skills of the fund-holders (Wright & Robbie, 1998; Rogers, Holland & Haas, 2002; Diller & Kaserer, 2009 ).
This concept of information asymmetry further reiterates the importance of sound evaluation processes in PE investments. The first published studies on the subject of investment decision criteria were done by Tyebjee & Bruno (1984) , MacMillan, Siegel & Subba Narasimha (1985) , and MacMillan, Zemann & Subba Narasimha (1987) , and each of these sought to provide useful rankings of the relative importance of various investment criteria.
Interestingly, the results of these studies generally point to the importance of the entrepreneur or management team when evaluating new projects. Pointing out similar research done in the mid-1990s by Fried and Hisrich (1994) , Wright and Robbie (1998) suggested that concern has shifted towards market acceptance of the product. This possibly indicates the developing sophistication of the US VC market at the time.
Findings in the US (Kakati, 2003) and contemporary research, albeit in a European VC context, for example Spain (Pintado et al., 2007) and Central and Eastern Europe (Farag, Hommel, Witt & Wright, 2004) , and in South African (van Deventer & Mlambo, 2009) , support the assertion that the entrepreneur and/or management team are an important decision criterion. According to Pintado et al. (2007, p. 85 ) the, "characteristics of the entrepreneur, manager background, and management team experience were consistently more important evaluation criteria than market and product characteristics. " Sander and Koomagi (2007) add further contemporary support, in their study of Estonian PE and VC firms, by indicating that non-financial criteria, in general, and the strengths of the management team, in particular, play an important role in the evaluation process.
Clearly there appears to be considerable consensus on the topic of the importance of management or entrepreneur-related criteria when evaluating new investments. However, one needs to look at a whole array of factors that influence the performance of new ventures since limiting the number of criteria in survey questionnaires may result in important characteristics of the process being overlooked (Kakati, 2003) . In this respect, van Deventer & Mlambo (2009) incorporated 54 possible decision criteria in their questionnaire. Wright & Robbie (1998) criticise the fact that the majority of the relevant literature relates to investment criteria employed by early-stage VC firms, with little attention given to differences in evaluation criteria according to investee growth stage. This is a view supported by Shepherd (1999: 629) who acknowledges the, "potential differences in a VC"s decision policy for businesses in different stages of development." While the above authors realised the need for such research in the late 1990s, there is in fact still very little written about the effects of the investment stage on the decision criteria used, except a few attempts by Farag et al. (2004) and Pintado et al. (2007) . These two studies focused on developed countries.
However, it is expected that the criteria differ not only according to investee growth stage, but also between developed and emerging markets. This study tries to close this gap by investigating the investment decision criteria employed by early-stage VC versus later-stage PE firms in an emerging market context, namely, South Africa.
Data and methods
A sample of South African PE and VC firms was surveyed using criteria identified by van The original questionnaire consisted of Likert-scale questions, determined through a literature analysis of criteria used by overseas venture capitalists. In extending the survey to PE firms, a few questions were slightly reworded, in line with the language commonly used in PE circles.
The re-wording mostly involved replacing the term "entrepreneur" with "management" in the PE survey instrument. The questions were constructed so that respondents will rate the investment decision criteria in order of importance on a scale of 1 (not important), to 5 (very important). The research is limited by the low response rate of only 46%, thus small sample size, and the tendency of the Likert-scale method to oversimplify peoples" responses (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010) .
Although a high response rate is preferable, it is not uncommon in economic surveys to have a low response rate. Out of 249 managers and entrepreneurs, Gratchev and Bobina (2001) received 64 responses, translating to a response rate of 26%, while Brau and Fawcett (2006) "s response rate was only 19%. One of the lowest response rates is by Bernile, Cumming and
Lyandres (2007) who received responses from 42 funds out of 8000 funds, translating to a response rate of 0.5%. However, in these studies, even though the response rates were low, they reached the "more than 30" observations rule of thumb for statistical analysis. In South
Africa, the population of PE and VC funds is low, such that a low response rate impacts on the choice statistical and econometrics analysis that can be done. In addition, one can only generalise results with a grain of salt.
While having one respondent per firm may result in responses not reflective of the view of the whole firm"s executive team, it is important to note that the effect is minimal since PE and VC firms typically have small executive teams. In addition, to avoid the order effect bias that normally comes with the use of questionnaires, the questions were ordered randomly within each category. The order effect bias is whereby the "relative position of an item in an inventory of questions or stimuli may uniquely influence the way in which a respondent reacts to the item" (Perreault, 1975: 544) .
Research analysis and findings
Analysis of group or category rankings
A nonparametric, Friedman two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was used to determine if there are any significant differences in the rankings of the four categories of criteria, namely, management, product, financial, and market considerations as ranked by PE firms and by VC firms. The test results are reported at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance in Table 1 .
Significant differences in the rankings of the four categories by both PE firms and VC firms are observed. In the case of PE firms, the observed Friedman statistic of 17.325 is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that at least two of the four categories differ. The management considerations category has the highest mean rank of 3.375 (as shown in Table 1 ), implying that it is the most important of the four categories. In the survey, 63% of PE firms ranked management considerations as the top most important criteria group, compared to 25% for the financial considerations, 13% for product considerations and 0% for marketing considerations.
Regarding VC firms, it is observed that while no significant differences exist in the rankings of the four categories at the 5% level of significance, they are found to exist at the 10% level of significance with a reported Friedman test statistic of 7.737. The mean ranking of management considerations was also found to be the highest of the four categories with a mean rank of 3.2. Whereas the lowest mean ranking for PE firms is observed for market considerations with a mean rank of 1.5, the lowest mean rank for VC firms is observed for the financial considerations category with a mean rank of 1.8.
Looking at the Kendall coefficients of concordance and the average rank correlation coefficient, it also appears that there is a relatively higher level of agreement in the rankings of the four categories by PE firms than by VC firms. Analysis of survey data done using STATISTICA *** Implies significance at the 1% level, ** Implies significance at the 5% level, * Implies significance at the 10% level , Std. Dev. = standard deviation
In order to undertake a direct comparison of the results of the PE and VC surveys as they pertain to the four respective categories, a pairwise comparison using the Mann-Whitney U test was carried out. Whereas no statistically significant differences are observed between PE and VC firms in their rankings of management, product and market considerations, significant differences are observed in the way the two fund types rank financial considerations. A Mann-Whitney z-statistic of 2.006 is observed for financial considerations, implying a statistical significance at the 5% level. This suggests that there are differences in the manner in which PE and VC firms assess financial considerations, a finding that is also observed in the responses to the open-ended questions.
Further to this, the Sign Test was employed to determine the significance of the differences in the mean rankings between the most important and the least important criteria groups, that is between management and market considerations for PE firms and between management and financial considerations for VC firms. However, in both cases, results are reported for both management versus market considerations and management versus financial considerations.
The results, as given in Table 2 , suggest that South African PE firms recognise management considerations to be more important than market considerations, and this result is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance with a Sign test z-statistic of 3.25. With VC firms, on the other hand, management considerations are found to be significantly more important than financial considerations and this result is observed at the 5% level of significance with a z-statistic of 2.214 (Table 2) . Analysis of survey data done using STATISTICA *** Implies significance at the 1% level ** Implies significance at the 5% level * Implies significance at the 10% level These findings are consistent with the literature where, among others, Sander and Koomagi, (2007) and Wright and Robbie (1998) 
Investment criteria rankings by private equity versus venture capital firms
To enable comparison with the van Deventer & Mlambo (2009) study, an examination of the most important and least important criteria is carried out and the mean rankings and standard deviations for the top ten and bottom ten criteria reported in Tables 3 and 4, respectively 6 .
Respondents were also given the opportunity to list and rate the importance of any additional criteria that were not mentioned in the questionnaire but which they felt should have been included. These additional criteria and their rankings are presented separately in Appendix Table A1 .
Ten most important criteria as ranked by private equity versus venture capital firms
The data (Table 3) indicate a strong bias towards management criteria, especially for PE firms, with five of the top ten criteria falling into this category, compared to one for market and one for financial considerations. With VC firms, although four of the top ten criteria are product considerations, the top three criteria all relate to management considerations and none of the criteria in the top ten relate to financial considerations. For both PE firms and VC firms, the honesty and integrity of the management team or entrepreneur top the list as the highest rated criterion. This finding is consistent with other findings by MacMillan et al. (1985) , Fried & Hisrich (1994) and Pintado et al. (2007) . MacMillan et al. (1985) , for example, reported in their findings that five of the top 10 most important criteria had something to do with the entrepreneur"s experience or personality.
A further interesting observation is that while a high IRR is ranked as the fourth most important criterion by PE firms with a mean rank of 4.6 and a low standard deviation of 0.51, a high IRR does not appear in the top ten most important criteria for VC firms 7 . This further asserts the view that later-stage investments are easier to value than early-stage investments.
While Wright and Robbie (1998: 526) seem to suggest that there is less focus on financial criteria at the early-stage, the findings by Pintado et al. (2007: 86) appear to be contrary. In their examination of the Spanish VC market they found evaluation factors affecting the required rate of return to be ranked as generally more important for early-stage than for latestage deals. 
Ten least important criteria as ranked by private equity and venture capital firms
The ten least important criteria as ranked by the PE and VC firms are detailed in Table 4 .
While the results are generally similar for both firm types, for PE firms, five of the ten least important criteria relate to financial considerations, compared to four for VC firms. For both PE and VC firms, two of the ten least important criteria each relate to market and product considerations, and one is a general criterion relating to the BEE status of the prospective business. Interestingly, in line with the findings thus far, and in line with the majority of available literature, none of the management criteria for PE firms, and only one for VC firms, appear in the ten least important criteria list. The least important criterion as ranked by PE respondents is whether the product or service in question makes use of an emerging or innovative technology. This criterion scored a mean rank of 2.0, compared to 3.8 obtained from the VC rankings.
Conversely, in the case of VC firms, the least important criterion is the venture"s BEE status with a mean rank of 1.88. This supports the assertion by Lingelbach et al. (2008) that BEE is in fact an inhibitor of early-stage VC activity in South Africa. Contrary to the supposition by Missankov et al. (2006) and van Niekerk & Krige (2009) that BEE acts as a significant incentive in the PE space, the "BEE status" criterion in this study is ranked as the fourth least important criterion by PE firms with a low mean rank of 2.4, and as the least important by VC firms as aforementioned. The importance of high barriers to entry in the market for PE firms was the most polarising with a standard deviation of 1.61. Although it achieved the ninth lowest mean rank of 2.8, two of the respondents opted to include it as an additional important criterion in the survey. Shepherd (1999) highlights the importance of high barriers in providing a new venture with a period of monopoly as a first entrant. As such high barriers can be considered more important for early-stage VC investments. In this study, high barriers to entry appear as the tenth least important criterion for VC firms, although it achieved a higher average rank of 3.04, compared to 2.8 for PE firms. The very high standard deviation for this criterion, in the case of the PE survey results, is likely to have occurred due to the fact that certain of the firms" investment activities cover a wide spectrum of opportunities from early-stage to later-stage investments and as such a high degree of variance is likely to be observed in the importance placed on competitive barriers.
Criteria rankings by venture capitalists: 2010 vs. 2007 surveys
In a similar study, van Deventer & Mlambo (2009) Tables 5 and 6 , respectively.
The most important criteria as ranked by venture capitalists: 2010 vs. 2007
Although in 2007, a high IRR was considered jointly with the entrepreneur"s honesty and integrity and a good market acceptance for the product or service, to be one of the most important criteria with a mean rank of 4.91, its importance in the 2010 survey has dropped significantly to an average rank of 4.02. Other criteria that have shown significant changes in ranking include the existence of an opportunity for an early exit, the merger or acquisition potential of the venture, the uniqueness and/or patentability of the product or service, how articulate the entrepreneur is about the venture, and the presence of a developed product or working prototype for the venture. Respondents to the open-ended questions indicated a general move away from investing in start-up ventures, where the opportunity for numerous rounds of financing is important 8 , towards more mature later-stage deals, where the ability to efficiently and profitably exit an investment is critical. This may well be in response to the recent financial crisis and the increased risk aversion by the VC firms that followed. Firms that took on too much risk are the ones that suffered the most during the financial crisis. Indeed, three of the VC firms that
responded to the open-ended questions indicated that they have shifted focus to later-stage deals due to increased uncertainty. Another respondent pointed out that exit opportunities have become more difficult in a post-financial crisis environment. The full responses to the open-ended questions are reported in Appendix Table A3 for PE funds and Appendix Table   A4 for VC funds. With regards to the least important criteria, the data reveals that apart from the importance of the criterion "no follow up investment required", the presence of a tax benefit in financing a venture has also improved in importance from a mean ranking of 1.91 in 2007 to 2.39 in 2010, albeit with a higher standard deviation, increasing from 0.70 to 1.07. With the current lack of deal flows, it may be that VC fund managers have become more creative in their investment decision motivations including exploiting the tax benefits of certain investment opportunities. This argument, however, is contrary to Tyebjee & Bruno"s (1984) finding that most venture capitalists focus their efforts on capital gains for their investors rather than act on the tax shield. In addition, no explanation for this item was provided in the open-ended questions.
Another interesting change is the decreased importance attached to the venture"s BEE status, with a decline in mean ranking from 2.36 to 1.88. Since many, if not all, BEE deals are leveraged buyouts, and thus highly geared, the sharp decline in leveraged transactions post the financial crisis must have made these deals less prominent. 
Statistical significance of differences in the responses
In order to test the statistical significances of the differences in the decision criteria rankings between PE and VC firms and between the VC firms in the 2007 and in the 2010 surveys, ttests for matched pairs were performed on the mean rankings of the 54 criteria used. For the PE versus VC comparisons, a t-statistic of -1.455 was observed indicating no statistically significant differences in the rankings by the two firm types, even at the 10% level of significance. This could be due to the closing gap between PE and VC in South Africa with investments becoming more concentrated on firms in the expansion and development phases. Farag et al. (2004) , Pintado et al. (2007) , Shepherd (1999) , and Wright & Robbie (1998) have attempted to test the differences between the two ends of the PE spectrum, that is, the earlystage and late-stage funds, but not between their investment criteria rankings. Source: Analysis of survey data using STATISTICA. a Obs. = observations. There were 54 items that were ranked in the questionnaire thus corresponding to 54 observations. Note that the values used for each firm type are the mean ranks as opposed to the raw data. b t-stat = t-statistics. The t-test used is for dependent samples c df = degrees of freedom.
Similarly, the comparison between the mean rankings in the 2010 and 2007 VC surveys yielded no significant differences. A t-statistics of -0.340 was observed, which is not significant at any of the three significance levels. Therefore, while there is a shift in the ranking of categories and certain selected criteria, the general ranking of criteria has not changed.
In order to assess ranking consistence and to deduce any changes, the responses by five VC representatives who completed both the 2007 and 2010 surveys were analysed and any differences assessed using the Sign test. The results are presented in Table 8 . Table 8 , it can be seen that there were no significant changes in the rankings by three of the five respondents. The only significant differences were observed for respondents A and E. Because these criteria are expected to be important in early-stage deals, this may confirm the assertion that there is a shift in South Africa from early-stage VC deals to later-stage PE investments.
In general, improved criteria rankings of more than two points by all five respondents pertains to the negative effects of uncertainty. These include the proposed venture"s resistance to economic cycles and whether it operates in a non-competitive industry and already has a working prototype. A number of the respondents asserted that an increasing amount of caution is now evident in the face of greater uncertainty.
Risk and return
In order to understand the importance that PE and VC firms place on return projections in evaluating projects for investment, four questions were included in the questionnaire, specifically on returns and valuations. Looking at the mean ranks of these four criteria (Table   9) , it is interesting to observe that although returns and valuations are still considered important by both PE and VC firms in their investment decision-making (with mean ranks above 3), they are not as important as they were in 2007. In 2007, the mean ranks for VCs for the same four criteria were all above 4, with the highest for IRR of 4.91.
In order to determine if the differences are significant, a comparison test was done using the Mann-Whitney test. There are no statistically significant differences in the rankings of these four criteria by PE and VC firms in 2010. However, there are statistically significant differences at the 5% level in the ranking of two of the criteria by VC firms in 2010 vis-à-vis 2007. Less importance is attached to high valuation projections and high IRR in 2010 compared to 2007, with Mann-Whitney z-statistics for the two criteria of -2.547 and -2.080, respectively. No explicit risk-specific criteria were included in the survey for ranking. However, two PE respondents added criteria on risk but under the management category (see Appendix Table   A1 ). In both cases, it seems they attach high importance to a manager who is not afraid to take risk, presumably implying high returns. In the open-ended questions, nonetheless, the indication is that risk appetite has generally declined post the financial crisis. In addition, the fact that firms with good managers survived the financial crisis, and not necessarily those that had promised high returns, may explain why high importance is now attached mostly to management criteria than to financial criteria.
Conclusions and recommendations
It is documented in the literature, internationally, that PE/VC is an important and growing contributor to economic growth. VC deals, although difficult to quantify, have become an increasingly important source of start-up funding (KPMG & SAVCA, 2008 & 2010 and Herrington et al., 2010) . Thus the declining trend of PE/VC investments in South Africa should be a cause for concern. Research on PE/VC especially in the South African context is distinctly lacking.
This study sets out to investigate the key criteria employed by PE and VC firms in evaluating new investment opportunities, and how these criteria differ between the two firm or fund It is found that criteria relating to the quality of management or the entrepreneur are the most important, from both the PE and VC perspective, and in line with previous findings elsewhere. Differences in rankings by the PE and VC firms relate to criteria such as the importance of BEE status and the relevance of the IRR performance measure -a financial criterion. While no statistically significant differences are observed between PE and VC firms using the t-test, there are significant differences in the rankings of financial considerations by the two fund types. PE firms are evidently more concerned with financial considerations than their VC counterparts.
With regards to the rankings of criteria by the VC firms in 2007 compared to 2010, no significant differences are observed. A pairwise comparison of the rankings by the five repeat VC survey participants indicates a shift in certain rankings, with significant differences for two out of the five participants. A closer look at the results indicates a decreased emphasis on financial criteria and a greater emphasis on risk aversion. In addition, there is an increased emphasis on criteria relating to the venture"s merger and/or acquisition potential and the opportunity for early exit, indicating a bias towards late stage PE investments.
Limitations and delimitations of the Study
The study only reports the importance of criteria as reported by respondents. However, what is reported may not necessarily be what is implemented in practice. Therefore, our results suffer from self-reporting bias. An accurate assessment is only possible by analysing the proposals that have been presented to PE and VC firms and grouping those that have been funded and those that have been rejected and through a comparative analysis determine why a project would be funded and why it would be rejected. Unfortunately, there is no database for such proposals to enable this kind of analysis. In addition, due to the small sample size, generalising the results to South Africa could be a problem.
Future Study
There is need to further study the changing nature of the PE/VC industry with respect to the allocation of funds between early-stage and later-stage deals. Given the importance of earlystage or start-up funding in enterprise development and economic growth, the observed shift in investment activities by VC funds towards late-stage deals in South Africa is a cause for concern and warrants further investigation. The case for the development of South Africa"s emerging (or stagnating) VC market needs to be contextualized accordingly so that appropriate policy solutions can be identified. In addition, the decreasing importance placed on financial valuation tools by both PE and VC firms, and the wider impact of the recent financial crisis on the industry need to be explored. Research should also focus on developing theory that can be used to understand the industry better, now and in the future. 1. Finding the investment that has the potential for growth in their industry and that has the right structures in place to be a market leader. 2. Confidence in alternative asset type financing needs to be rebuilt and more focus must be put on growing companies as opposed to using high levels of gearing in an attempt to gain returns through financial structuring as opposed to tangible growth.
Appendices Appendix
2
PE has moved more towards the fundamentals on which it developed as an asset class with a greater trend towards growth investment as opposed to the buyout model. The ability to successfully partner management teams and add value beyond the capital invested has become more relevant.
No change -[firm] established 2006
Obviously the ability to pursue highly leveraged transactions has been affected. In addition, many potential investors have lowered their alternative asset allocations. The industry has been classed with a bad name as a result of some of the highly leveraged transactions that took place immediately prior to the crisis -this does result in opportunity however. There are a lot more opportunities to invest in but borrowing from the retail banks has become harder, so structuring of deals has become even more important with deferred payments, warranties etc.
The major challenges are lack of debt funding, the competition commission and government regulation of more and more markets making it harder to get critical mass in any one sector.
5
The only impact we have felt from the financial crisis is that debt funding is harder to obtain and more expensive, limiting our ability to do heavily leveraged deals.
None Bank funding 6
As a minority equity investor that generally does not look to structured finance in its transactions, and focussing on Africa, north of South Africa, where very little credit is used (in general), the main changes we"ve seen over the last 3 years are valuation expectations by vendors. In 2008/2009, these were high compared with 2006/2007 years. Often vendors and PE shops couldn"t get to as middle ground due to unrealistic expectations. Also, as pure equity provider, we have had access to opportunities that in more upbeat economic times would have gone to other funding sources (e.g. institutions/IPOs/debt etc.)
Focussed on building a stronger team that has improved portfolio management capacity, as some investments require a lot of focus in an economic downturn. Also revised the deal and team structure to get significant "eyes on a deal" to mitigate risk.
In Africa, more money chasing the same, or fewer deals, as growth metrics can be quite attractive relative to other emerging markets that had more credit facilities. E.g. South Africa, Central & Easter Europe. LP"s also becoming more demanding with regard to portfolio management and performance. The financial crisis has in some cases highlighted weaknesses in certain firms, which were previously hidden behind a bullish market.
7
There is general acceptance now that leverage alone should not be sufficient to generate private equity returns. The fund manager must add value to the business fundamentals and returns should be generated by growth and multiple expansion, not just by yield and leverage
There is an increasing realisation that banks should lend and not make risky and/or illiquid proprietary investments. This has changed our prospective investor base and our competitive landscape
As private equity is inherently illiquid, how do investors with liabilities, member choice or strategy changes justify continued investment in the asset class? The flight to liquidity must adversely affect long term equity risk taking 8 Businesses are funded through more equity then debt than what was historically the case. Sustainable earnings are now in question.
Need to look at different funding structures in comparison to the historical high leverage model.
Cost base of most companies too high for current level of activity. Gearing levels need to reduce further.
9
Sharp reduction in deals being completed due to increased difficulty in arguing a growth model for a business in difficult economic environment (rather than due to insufficient "dry powder")
Increased focus on tight covenant structures Achievement of target returns (IRR and X money) after significant losses on portfolios. Underperformance of PE funds makes future fund-raisings more difficult.
10
Deals are fewer due to continued buyer/vendor valuation gap, lower amounts of debt available to fund deals, increased equity commitments to make deals a reality.
Reduction in the absolute size of the portfolio as a form of risk mitigation.
A new jerk reaction of regulators with various new regulatory proposals up for discussion. There is no VC to speak of in SA. Invenfin, with a small fund is the only one. HP is ITC only. IDC is "soft strategic". Government and TIA is not working and crowding out private sector. They need to stop taking equity.
Going slow None 3
There is increased risk averseness thus fewer early-stage deals will be funded. We have seen investors default and this has driven away many investors from the VC and private equity funds.
We have gone from managing a VC fund to now managing a private equity fund.
How do you fund start-ups? As most funds move to laterstages who will fund the early-stage? In particular who will fund high tech early-stage as these companies need the hand holding that VC provides. The other major challenge is finding investors! 4
The M&A market and the VC market outside SA has become more restricted and therefore offer less opportunities No changes were made More difficult exit opportunities
5
As the banks and other traditional finance providers became more conservative with their lending policies, entrepreneurs turn to alternative sources of finance, adding to an influx of VC deal flow. However, the number of South African VC transactions, as well as transaction values, decreased significantly over the past two years as VCs conserved capital by assisting portfolio companies to maintain a low cash burn rate (planning, cost cutting etc). It is also more difficult for SA entrepreneurs to obtain seed or start-up capital today as VC investors moved up the ladder towards later-stage development-and expansion-type deals as a result of the recession.
More conservative on doing new deals. More focus on steering the existing portfolio through the crisis. Taking more risks at doing earlier stage deals.
Not everyone responded to the open-ended questions
